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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

IC 77-2519
20 July 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM:

Chairman, Ad Hoc Nuclear Proliferation
Data Base Working Group

SUBJECT:

Nuclear Proliferation Data Base Working
Group (DBWG/NP) Meetings

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1. The third and fourth DBWG/NP meetings are
scheduled for 0930-1230, Friday, 29 July 1977 and Thursday,
4 August 1977, respectively,

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2. The agendas for these meetings:

a. Friday, 29 July 1977

Purpose: to provide for the Working Group a
review of data base research and activities within the
Community; to provide a common base upon which to make
judgments and decisions concerning improvements in the
Community's management of its nuclear proliferation
intelligence data.

--0930-0945: Opening remarks and review of
previous business

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--0945-1015: Presentation-

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--1015-1045: Presentation-

DOE review
completed.

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DIA, DOS and OSD review(s)
completed.

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Meetings

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--1045-1100: Break

--1100-1130:

--1130-1200:

--1200-1230:

--1230 : Adjourn

NOTE: Working Group principals are urged to include appropriate staffers at this session.

b. Thursday, 4 August 1977

Purpose: to make decisions based on the draft data base concept developed by CIA (attached).

--0930-0945: Opening remarks and review of the concept prepared by CIA

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--0945-1045: Discussion of draft data base concept.
(All)

--1045-1100: Break

--1100-1230: Drafting Assignments, proposed schedule and contractor assistance
(All)

--1230 : Adjourn

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Meetings

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3. [] Each addressee is asked to review and comment on the attached concept paper. Primary agency/organization responsibility for the data base components identified in the paper are suggested in parenthetical entries. Comments and suggested revisions should be submitted at the 29 July meeting to Mr. George W. Allen [] of CIA's Center for Policy Support. Divergent views will be discussed at the 4 August meeting. 25X1

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4. [] These meetings will be at the SI/TK level. Please submit the names of attendees to me [] by 22 July and forward certifications of their security clearances to Mr. 25X1

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Attachment
As Stated

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

8 July 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR:



Production Assessment and Improvement Division
IC Staff

FROM : G. W. Allen
Center for Policy Support

SUBJECT : Concept for a Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence
Data Base

Forwarded herewith is a draft concept on a data base as requested
by your nuclear proliferation data base working group. This has been
coordinated only within CIA at this point.

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G. W. Allen

Attachment
As Stated

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Concept for a Nuclear Proliferation
Intelligence Data Base

1. What is a data base? One useful definition is: "a body of information organized for analysis or used as the basis for a decision." It is not necessarily stored in a computer and does not necessarily repose in a single file, vault, or office. It can include both "finished" intelligence publications used by policy-makers and working files of raw and processed information used by analysts in preparing and updating those publications or in answering the questions of senior decision-makers.

2. The nuclear proliferation intelligence data base should define the kinds of intelligence data or products required to support decision-making and allocate responsibility to appropriate agencies for the development and maintenance of those data or products. The establishment of a nuclear proliferation intelligence data base will not cause wholesale transfers of data from one office or agency to another, but rather establish a coherent structure which would overlay and be compatible with the division of labor between components of the intelligence community.

3. The National Intelligence Estimate on Nuclear Proliferation stands at the peak of intelligence products on the subject. It

summarizes the state of knowledge available to the US about the prospects for proliferation generally, and in all candidate countries. It brings together, in a single document, the community's current assessment of nuclear proliferation prospects around the world.

4. Another important product is the interdisciplinary country study which CIA produces. Such studies examine, in greater detail and specificity, developments in individual countries as they relate to the proliferation problem. They provide judgments on issue-related factors identified as important by senior policy-making individuals and derived from the analysis of ongoing developments and programs. They contain a summary matrix which graphically sets forth where that country stands with respect to critical elements in the proliferation process. They include narrative sections which discuss relevant political, economic, technological, and military factors in that country. And finally, they address a collection strategy to fill gaps in available information.

5. Other basic components of a proliferation data base useful to decision-makers and their staffs might include:

--A compilation of potential delivery systems which proliferating countries might already possess or be interested in procuring. This would include an analysis of the foreign military assistance and sales activities of all arms exporting

nations to determine what candidate delivery systems are available, what their nuclear capability might be, and which potential proliferating nations already possess or have easy access to these military systems. (DOD)

--A primer on nuclear fuel cycles, explaining ways in which weapons usable fissile materials can be produced. This would be an analysis and compilation from the point of view of the proliferation problem to describe to the interested policy-maker or layman exactly where the trouble spots are in the entire fuel cycle. (ERDA)

--A primer on the paths to proliferation which would outline alternative routes by which countries can achieve a nuclear capability and identify critical technological capabilities or equipment required. (Both DIA and ERDA have made progress on this problem, but an activity which has community-wide sanction and support is needed.)

--A primer on safeguardability and safeguard agreements which describe and explain, to the interested policy-maker or non-safeguard expert, the essential elements and the strengths and weaknesses of the various safeguard agreements and the specific technical and legal problems with safeguarding the various processes in the entire fuel cycle. (ERDA)


--A catalog of the world's nuclear facilities. (ERDA, already underway)

--An intelligence collection guide, including a summary of indicators, on nuclear proliferation, which provides detailed questions relevant to proliferation. (DIA/CIA)

6. Next in line would be intelligence studies, memoranda, and articles on nuclear proliferation prepared by various components of the intelligence community. These could range from very detailed research studies on some aspect of foreign nuclear technology, or a broad-ranging analysis of the energy needs and resources of a region such as Africa, to brief reports of specific developments. They are published in a variety of formats, including hard-cover and memoranda to current intelligence briefs, and are disseminated by the originating agency to consumers at their discretion.

7. The finished intelligence studies and guides should be supported by detailed reference and working files maintained by appropriate agencies and accessible by all as needed:

--Inventory of fissile materials, including reports on movements of materials. (ERDA)



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--Political files, including relevant government institutions and decision-making elements, foreign and domestic policies, etc. (State/CIA)

--Economic files, including energy resources and programs.
(CIA)

--Nuclear technology files, including nuclear power systems, research reactors, fuel supplies, etc. (ERDA)

--Scientific.

--Industrial. (CIA/DIA)

--Advanced nuclear technologies. (ERDA)

--Nuclear weapons R&D and testing. (CIA/DIA)

--Military forces and delivery systems. (DIA/CIA)

8. Because of the press of ongoing analytical work and resource constraints, it would seem appropriate to proceed deliberately toward the establishment of a community data base on a step-by-step basis, with agreed-to milestones to pause and reflect on the usefulness of progress to date.

--The NIE is in process.

--The initial CIA country study is near completion; others will be prepared on a deliberate schedule.

--Certain of the other basic studies, such as those described above, could be selected for immediate attention.

--Work on ERDA's inventory of fissile materials, which has been approved and funded, should proceed forthwith as the first step, with others to follow as they are identified and assigned.

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[REDACTED] is completing a study for DIA concerning analysis of the proliferation potential of an individual country. This study includes a systematic and extensive listing of questions concerning all aspects of proliferation which could serve as a guide to the development of information files on the subjects listed in paragraph 7.